DMR-based Technique for Fault Tolerant AES S-box Architecture by Taheri, Mahdi et al.
                                                                                          1 
DMR-based Technique for Fault Tolerant AES S-box Architecture   
  
Mahdi Taheri1, Saeideh Sheikhpour1, Mohammad Saeed Ansari2 and Ali Mahani1 
1Department of Electrical Engineering, Shahid Bahonar University, Kerman, Iran 
2Eideticom Computational Storage, Calgary, AB, Canada 
 
Abstract— This paper presents a high-throughput fault-
resilient hardware implementation of AES S-box, called HFS-box.  
We propose deep pipelining S-box in the gate level in which a novel 
DMR technique is used for fault correction. Proposed fault-
resilient technique is based on fault correction in DMR 
implementation (FC-DMR) of each S-box’s combined with a 
temporal redundancy technique. If a transient natural or even 
malicious fault(s) in each pipeline stage is detected, the 
corresponding error signal become high and as a result the control 
unit holds the output of our proposed DMR voter till the fault 
effect disappears. Proposed low-cost HFS-box provide a high 
capability of fault tolerant against transient faults with any 
duration by putting low area overhead, i.e. 137%, and low 
throughput degradation, i.e. 11.3%, on the original 
implementation.  
Keywords— Fault-Resilient, AES, S-box, High-Throughput.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Dependable applications, like secure information systems, 
remote security services, online banking, etc play an important 
role in our daily lives. Secure storage and communication are 
critical requirements of these applications. Nowadays, 
cryptography is extensively used in dependable applications to 
meet these critical requirements and in consequence, prevent 
any unauthorized access to the secure information. Another 
important requirement of dependable application is reliability.  
Therefore, in many cases, a fault resilient approach 
incorporated with original hardware implementation [1]. 
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [2] was 
standardized by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) in 1997. After that AES has been one of the 
most common symmetric cryptographic algorithms. Until now, 
many hardware implementations of the AES were proposed 
with different characteristics [3-6] which each of them is suited 
for different applications with different constraints. Recently, 
many fault injection attacks has been proposed on AES [7-9]. 
In a fault attack, attackers inject malicious faults into the VLSI 
design of cryptographic primitives to extract secure information 
(i.e. cryptographic key).     
On the other hand, with transistor size downscaling, 
reducing power supply voltage level, increasing operating 
frequencies and therefore reducing noise margins, VLSI 
hardware designs will be more and more sensitive to random 
faults occurrence [10]. All random faults that occur in VLSI 
designs can be grouped into transient and permanent faults. 
To thwart the random and/or malicious faults effect, various 
fault resilient hardware implementations of AES were proposed 
[11-14]. AES include four basic operations, named SubByte, 
ShifRows, MixColumns and AddRoundKey.  The hardware 
implementation of SubByte operation is realized with 16 S-
Boxes that are nonlinear mapping in which replace each byte of 
state array with another byte. It also occupies much of the total 
AES hardware implementation area [15]. So, integrating its 
hardware implementations with an efficient fault resilient 
scheme is crucial for making the AES robust to the random 
and/or malicious faults. There are many online error detection 
schemes for SubByte implementation of AES, see for example 
[16-17]. 
Just a few studies among previous research works have 
addressed the fault correction. In fact, in most of the previous 
studies only detection task is considered and so, for their 
solutions the extra corrective operations should be employed. 
In [18] a hybrid redundancy in which hardware redundancy and 
time redundancy are combined for fault correction in S-box is 
proposed. Their proposed S-box architecture can tolerate the 
single faults. It's worth noting that the fault tolerant S-box in 
[18] provided a high level of reliability against the natural faults 
due to the essence of electronic devices, not the malicious faults 
in the fault attacks. The main aim of the present paper is to 
propose a high-throughput fault-resilient hardware 
implementation of the AES S-box. We propose a correction 
scheme in hardware level so that the circuit frequency is not 
significantly affected. In this paper a high-speed design is 
considered. In fact, we exploit the features of gate-level 
implementation of S-box allowing pipeline technique to speed 
up the hardware implementation of SubByte operation of AES. 
The proposed technique is also practical for any generic cipher 
block. 
The main contributions of this paper are including as 
follows: 
- We present an implementation of high-throughput and 
lightweight S-box in the gate level for high-speed AES 
encryption.   
- We propose a fault-resilient technique, i.e. FC-DMR, 
for real-time applications which cannot tolerate high 
running time and require a high-speed process. 
Proposed technique generally could be used in all 
digital functional units.  
- We design a new DMR voter which is composed of the 
standard library components and could be implemented 
on any digital platform such as FPGA and ASIC. 
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Fig. 1.  Composite field based S-box architecture. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
presents a brief background of the S-box of AES algorithm 
and its implementation. Section III presents the proposed 
fault-resilient technique (FC-DMR) besides our DMR voter 
model.  
It also describes the HFS-box architecture. We evaluate 
the proposed architecture’s architectural characteristics in 
terms of area, frequency and throughput in section IV. Finally, 
section V concludes the paper. 
II. S-BOX IMPLEMENTATION  
In this subsection, we describe the S-box operation and 
its utilized architecture. The proposed S-box architecture 
using composite-field in [19] is employed in this paper. The 
S-box operation which is believed to be most resource 
consuming among other AES operation, is a nonlinear 
mapping on each state array byte. This nonlinear mapping is 
nothing but finding a multiplicative inverse over GF(28) , i.e. 
𝑥−1𝜖 𝐺𝐹(28)followed by an affine transformation. In other 
words, if 𝑦 = 𝑆𝐵(𝑥) and 𝑋𝜖𝐺𝐹(28) and 𝑌𝜖𝐺𝐹(28), then we 
have:  
𝑦 = 𝐴𝑥−1 + 𝑏 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1   1   0   0   0   0   1   0
0   1   0   0   1   0   1   0
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Since direct multiplicative inversion of S-box 
computation is costly, multiplicative inversion in composite 
fields is preferred [20]. This implementation leads to lower 
complexity and smaller implementation area. The S-box 
implementation using composite-field and polynomial basis 
is illustrated in Fig. 1. As shown in this figure, the 8-bit input 
of multiplicative inversion, i.e., 𝑋 = ∑ 𝛼𝑖𝑥𝑖
7
𝑖=0 in the binary 
field GF(28),using the transformation matrix δ transforms to 
composite-field 𝐺𝐹(28)/𝐺𝐹(((22)2)2). In turn, the output 
of the multiplicative inverse from composite-field transforms 
back to binary field GF(28) by the inverse transformation 
matrix δ-1 to obtain X-1. The hierarchical composite-field 
decomposition, i.e.,  𝐺𝐹(((22)2)2) → 𝐺𝐹((22)2) , 
𝐺𝐹((22)2) → 𝐺𝐹(22) and 𝐺𝐹(22) → 𝐺𝐹(2) , can be made 
using the irreducible polynomials of 𝑥2 + 𝑥 + 𝜆, 𝑥2 + 𝑥 + 𝜑 
and 𝑥2 + 𝑥 + 1, respectively. As shown in Fig. 1, the output 
of S-box i.e., Y, is obtained using the affine transformation 
after inverse transformation (δ-1) [19]. The S-box compose of 
the multiplications, the squaring and the inversion that all of 
them are over 𝐺𝐹((22)2). Besides these arithmetic blocks, 
the S-box includes modulo-2 addition that realized by XOR 
gates, see Fig. 1. Considering this figure, the output of the S-
box can be formulated as following: 
𝜎ℎ = ((𝜉ℎ + 𝜉𝑙)𝜉𝑙 + 𝜉ℎ
2𝜆)−1𝜉ℎ (2) 
𝜎𝑙 = ((𝜉ℎ + 𝜉𝑙)𝜉𝑙 + 𝜉ℎ
2𝜆)−1(𝜉ℎ + 𝜉𝑙) (3) 
 
Where, the ξ and σ are the input and output of the 
multiplicative inversion, respectively. 
III. PROPOSED FAULT CORRECTION STRUCTURE (FC-DMR)  
A. FC-DMR 
We propose a correction technique in a DMR 
implementation of a digital circuit (FC-DMR) depicted in Fig. 
2. The proposed FC-DMR protects the operation of both 
combinational and the sequential parts of a digital circuit in 
each pipeline stage. Fig. 2 depicts an instance pipeline stage 
i in the intended circuit. As depicted in this Figure, our FC-
DMR is consist of the following elements:  
- Pipeline Logici (original): a part of system’s 
combinational logic utilized to process data in the 
original mode in the ith pipeline stage. 
- Pipeline Logici (redundant): a redundant copy of the 
original ith pipeline stage utilized to process data in 
the redundant mode in the ith pipeline stage. 
- Register stagei: the register or sequential part of the 
ith pipeline includes DMR register and two DMR 
voters to preserve the correct state in present of fault.  
- DU: the fault detection unit which is actually 
implemented using a comparator must provide the 
output error signal erri which indicate any 
differences in the DMR register in the ith pipeline 
stage occur. 
- CU: the control unit produce the Err which is a 
general error signal and indicates a fault occurrence 
in the system (any pipeline stage), i.e., a fault is 
detected.  
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Fig. 2.  Proposed fault correction technique in DMR implementation (FC-DMR). 
 
The input of each pipeline stage is processed by the 
pipeline logic and its redundant unit. The corresponding 
output of the original and redundant pipeline logic units are 
stored in the register stages, i.e. pipeline register1 and pipeline 
register2, respectively. If the register’s contents are identical, 
no fault(s) is (are) detected. Otherwise, the comparator 
CMPi’s output in DUi, i.e. erri, will be activated. Two DMR 
voter are employed to protect both combinational and 
sequential part of the system. Proposed technique can correct 
any transient fault which occurs in a single S-box. When a 
fault detects in any pipeline stage components, either in the 
logic stages, in the pipeline registers, or in the DU, the CU 
will reset its output, i.e. Err and later it prevents loading the 
incorrect state on the output of DMR voters.  
Hence, the pipeline logics process previous correct state 
till the fault effect disappears. When the fault effect 
disappears, the next correct state will process without any 
problem. This solution may put a negligible delay overhead 
on the critical path due to the comparison and voting.  
B. Proposed voter 
The employed voter does the two tasks of a majority voter 
in a DMR technique which is: holding the previous state 
when faces a mismatch and changing the vote signal’s value 
when both modules produce a same output. 
In fact, when the outputs of the two replicas are not the 
same as each other which means an error has occurred, the 
voter holds the previous value until the two replicas’ outputs 
become similar. Besides, our design has a delay module 
which is useful in case of the comparator faces a mismatch. 
This delay makes it possible to affecting the enable signals. 
Enables are provided to control internal wires not to send the 
faulty signals to voter’s output which means that pipeline 
stage be unchanged until the correct value gains and the 
sequence in our pipeline design remains unaffected. 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Proposed voter in gate level. 
C. HFS-box 
The main contribution of this paper is proposing high-
throughput fault-resilient hardware implementations of S-
box.  
We propose a fully pipeline implementation of S-box in 
composite field approach which leads to reduction of the 
circuit critical path. In fact, this solution enables us to 
enhance frequency of clock signal in our proposed method 
and also makes it suitable for meeting the high-speed 
application requirements.   
Proposed pipeline S-box is depicted in Fig. 4. We place 
pipeline registers into this schema which are illustrated by the 
dotted lines. As depicted in this figure, proposed S-box 
architecture (shown in Fig. 1) is divided into 5 stage. This 
pipeline registers are inserted to S-box architecture so that the 
critical path is optimally pipelined. This architecture is 
integrated with proposed FC-DMR to achieve fault tolerance 
for any transient fault in both combinational and sequential 
parts in any pipeline stage of a single S-box, named HFS-box. 
In HFS-box each DMR implementation of pipeline logic is 
lied between two register stages to check against fault 
occurrence as depicted in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 4.  The architecture of the S-box with 5-stage pipeline. 
 
 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION RESULT 
To evaluate the proposed HFS-box, we compare it with 
the TMR and TTR implementation of S-box, as traditional 
fault tolerant structures with high fault correction capability. 
We report the synthesis result by using the TSMC 180 nm 
CMOS. We employ Verilog as design entry description 
language and Synopsys DC as the-synthesis tool. It should be 
noted the 8-bit SubByte operation is considered so in each 
structure a single S-box is needed.  
Table 1.  Throughput, maximum frequency, area result. 
Design metric Origina
l 
TMR TTR HFS-
box 
Area GE 212.42 673.3
1 
279.0
2 
503.4
6 
% - 216 31.35 137 
Frequenc
y 
MHz 555 525 519 492 
% - -5.4 -6.4 -11.3 
Throu. Mbps 4440 4200 1384 3936 
% - -5.4 -68.8 -11.3 
Fault 
tolerance 
Transient     
Permanen
t 
    
Security against fault 
attack 
    
 
 
In this section, the ASIC implementation results of all 
fault-tolerant S-box implementations are reported and 
compared. The design features that we consider contain area, 
area overhead, frequency and frequency overhead. Table 1 
presents the implementation results of all fault resilient 
designs.  
In this table, we use equations 4 to calculate the- the-cost 
overhead. 
 𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 =
𝐶𝐹𝑇 − 𝐶O
𝐶O
 (4) 
Where, 𝐶O is the original implementation cost (area, 
frequency, throughput, etc.), and 𝐶𝐹𝑇  is the cost of the fault 
tolerant implementation. It can be seen that TTR has the 
lowest area overhead (44.5% and 58.54% reduction 
compared to HFS-box and TMR, respectively) and at the 
same time lower throughput, (64.83% and 67.04% worse 
than HFS-box and TMR, respectively). HFS-box requires 
about 503 NAND gate equivalences (GEs). Actually, it puts 
more area overhead than TTR but still is much better than 
TMR (25.22% better than TMR). However, TMR achieves 
the best throughput among all fault resilient architectures, its 
security and reliability against fault attacks is lower than our 
HFS-box and also it puts much more area overhead on the 
original S-box than HFS-box. In fact, proposed low-cost 
HFS-box can continue its proper task without considerable 
negative impact on the system speed or even any traditional 
recovery scheme. It is a suitable fault tolerant technique for 
resource-constrained applications that require a high level of 
security.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we proposed a lightweight high-throughput 
fault-resilient architecture for composite field S-box 
implementation of AES which consume the largest space in 
AES, named HFS-box. The proposed fault-resilient 
technique is based on fault correction in DMR 
implementation (FC-DMR) combined with a temporal 
redundancy technique. It is able to correct transient faults 
which may occur in S-box naturally or maliciously. Our 
solution is valid for any digital circuit implementation 
(specially block cipher hardware implementation) with 
different level of pipelining. HFS-box uses 5 pipeline stage 
to meet the real-time application requirements for speed and 
throughput. Indeed, we inserted pipeline registers in optimal 
places in the S-box architecture. Furthermore, we introduced 
a compatible DMR voter with our FC-DMR. The proposed 
HFS-box and two well-known methods with high fault-
tolerant ability, i.e. TMR, TTR have been implemented on 
ASIC using TSMC 180nm CMOS technology and their area, 
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frequency and throughput have been derived and reported. 
The synthesis results pointed out that the HFS-box has a low 
area overhead (137%) and low throughput degradation (11.3) 
compared with other fault tolerant schemes.  
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